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Two general tendencies can be distinguished in 
the use of the term worldview (weltanschauung), ten-
dencies that reveal profound differences, which I 
propose to examine in this essay. The two conno-
tations give rise to two very different assessments 
of talking and thinking about worldview. Those who 
discourage its use often identify it with an unprin-
cipled pluralism or relativism; those who favor 
its use identify it with a web or system of beliefs 
with a common denominator, a system that clari-
fies implications for life and vocation. 1 Although 
there is no mention of anything like worldview in 
the Bible, the importance of what a person thinks 
and believes is stressed throughout. 2 If attention 
to worldview serves this emphasis without com-
promise, it is beyond reproach. Before we can 
clearly distinguish the two connotations, we must 
consider what quite generally is at stake in the idea 
of worldview. My overall goal is to show that dis-
cussions of worldview can be very valuable, while 
pointing out certain ways the notion of worldview 
can be misunderstood and misused. I start with a 
brief definition and then turn to the history of art, 
reflecting on the fact that each people and culture 
inevitably portrays things in their own characteris-
tic way. This, I suggest, indicates the presence of a 
worldview.
A good way of approaching the idea of world-
view, I contend, is that there is “beneath and beyond 
all the details in our ideas of things…a certain esprit 
d’ ensemble.” 3 This French expression, used by Orr, 
is insightful: It says there is something that colors 
and gives flavor to the content of what a person or 
group believes. It implies that such an esprit unites 
all the particulars into a consistent whole. It also 
means that something comes about out of a certain 
arrangement of details that displays this esprit. Such 
a “spirit” is that which enables all the details to fit 
together in the first place, like a hidden “logic.” 
Something is shared that goes beyond individual 
details while imparting unity and character to 
them as a whole. The esprit is an overall meaning 
and impression arising in and through everything. 
Like the “spirit” of the law often spoken of, it is 
something better, more life-giving than anything 
simply evident in the details or parts of our ideas of 
things. It is something under, over, and above all 
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the parts as such, a shared quality or feel. As such, 
it denotes the web-like structure of human belief(s), 
the coherence of life as reflected in thought, the in-
terconnectedness of thought and reality. Worldview 
depends upon the unity of human existence and 
the coherence of it (and thought) as fitting together 
within one creation. Like the “spirit” of the law, 
the meaning of worldview is sometimes better, 
more beneficial than what people at times make of 
it. Yes, talk of worldviews can, like everything else, 
be misused and misplaced. But this misuse does 
not detract from its intrinsic value or the insight it 
offers us into reality.4
In his book Art and Illusion, a study in the psychol-
og y of pictorial representation, E.H. Gombrich consid-
ers the following question: “Why is it that differ-
ent ages and different nations have represented the 
visible world in such different ways?” 5 Think, for 
example, of how differently landscapes are repre-
sented in Medieval as compared with seventeenth- 
century Netherlandish painting. Or imagine two 
artists, one from China and one from England, sit-
ting in front of the same lake, making a drawing or 
painting of it. Even though we know that seeing 
and recognition always occur within some frame 
of reference, it seems natural to us to assume that 
what the two artists see is the same. This amounts 
to saying, however, that the lake’s true appearance 
is what is captured in a photograph. Yet, when we 
look at a photo, we automatically compensate for 
its flatness, point of focus, shadows, size, and tex-
ture discrepancies, repeatedly reminding ourselves 
of what the various things in the picture “stand 
for.” Skillful representative works of art do this 
and much more for the viewer, although the viewer 
will still compensate for certain “discrepancies.”
We read a lot into a photograph and somewhat 
less into a painting. Paintings involve more select-
ing and poignant presenting of what the artist con-
siders important for us to see. Still, we wonder why 
the artist who paints the lake in the Chinese fash-
ion does not see what we (seem to) see and gladly 
accepts what we consider the discrepancy (between 
what we see when we compare her painting with 
a photo). Why doesn’t she see the same thing we 
do and notice the obvious difference between her 
lake and what we see (there, or) in the photo? She 
doesn’t see the same thing we see probably because 
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she considers its Chinese look or style to be true 
and correct—a look which to her the lake obviously 
does have and to us it obviously does not have. We 
tend to think in a similar way about accents: people 
who don’t talk like us have accents—but we don’t, 
or at least we think we don’t. 6 
Compensation factors are always at work. We 
make allowances for discrepancies of appearance, 
caused by bad lighting, distorting weather condi-
tions, and uncharacteristic momentary looks, in 
order to portray and bring out what something is 
“really” like. Familiar objects can suddenly look 
strange in certain environments, just as strangers 
can sometimes be mistaken for familiar persons. A 
lot of what we perceive is what we have been taught 
and (come to) consider important. Similarly, when 
someone says something in a foreign language, it is 
hard to even make out the sounds, let alone what 
(s)he is saying. Goethe once said that people hear 
only that which they understand. The uninitiated 
eye or ear is not very open to what is just there. 
A good (picture) frame tells us how and where to 
look; it should intimate the kind of painting we 
are meant to see; the frame also tells us where the 
little world (and story) of the painting starts and 
ends—even though a frame (work) is not made to 
be consciously noticed. 7
Like any other picture, the Chinese lake paint-
ing (above) presumes to reveal what is important 
and real about the lake but perhaps not obvious 
to us at first. After seeing the painting, we may 
be able to see the lake in the Chinese fashion and 
appreciate important facets of the lake previously 
hidden to our view; the profound and skillful artist 
highlights what is most savored, worthwhile, good, 
or true, rendering this service to the viewer. And 
here we have a parallel with worldviews—they 
give us eyes to see and understand what otherwise 
might have gone unnoticed. Although artistic limi-
tations can never be excluded from explaining va-
riety in representation, the very existence of artistic 
schools, styles, and traditions tells us that like (ver-
bal) languages, artistic conventions of representa-
tion are not merely individual but communal—as 
are languages, accents, and worldviews. We tend to 
see, think, and talk about things as do our friends 
and like-minded community. For these and other 
reasons to be mentioned later, I argue in this es-
say that worldviews are communally held, shared 
perspectives, or ways of thinking, passed down 
from old to young. This means that they are not 
the same as philosophy or religion—philosophy 
being more analytical and abstract, religion being 
an all-embracing way of life and not limited to a 
way of thinking.
A worldview is like a certain encryption code 
allowing us to open, organize, and “place” the 
things we see within familiar categories. One of 
Gombrich’s main points throughout his book is 
that “to see a few members of a series is to see 
them all”; 8 and this is one of the keys to how per-
ception is assisted by acquaintance with a world-
view, a category, type, or kind. The operative 
word in the quotation is “members.” What makes 
a member a member is that it shares in the same 
esprit or spirit. In this way things fall into certain 
categories as members of groups or kinds—and ac-
quaintance with these assists discovery. Similarly, 
once a person has become aware of a certain esprit, 
style, or brand, for example, of architecture, mu-
sic, or clothing, it becomes easily recognized any-
where. A brand is like a man-made generic type 
or kind. You need only hear a few bars or catch a 
quick glimpse of something to know that it is one 
of that kind. Acquaintance with a type or kind is an 
identifier that tells a whole story. This is similar to 
the way worldview-awareness works and assists us. 
Familiarity with one tells us a great deal about what 
to expect from members of the community possessed 
of it. The reason for this correlation is that reality 
is highly integrated; things are tied together with a 
thousand bonds constituting kinds and types in a 
coherence, not an aggregate of things just standing 
side by side. Attaining a “view” of a whole affords 
an implicit, intuitive, or tacit grasp of many things, 
A worldview is like a certain 
encryption code allowing us 
to open, organize, and “place” 
the things we see within 
familiar categories.
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and this grasp is something a worldview offers.
Equivocal Perceptions
Related to worldview, a relevant question today is 
no longer just whether different people living in 
different cultures and ages perceive things in dif-
ferent ways but the significance of one and the 
same person perceiving one thing in different, in-
compatible ways. It has become popular to present 
one thing that can be seen in two different ways, 
such as the rabbit-duck or the young-woman/old-
woman drawings.9 While there is a certain fascina-
tion in perceiving “one thing” in two ways, such 
experiences can also be unsettling. If the world and 
any one thing can be perceived in different ways by 
one and the same person, does this mean there is 
no such thing as truth? Is truth, then, paradoxical? 
In spite of its problems, this is a conclusion many 
people feel driven to draw, once they have expe-
rienced a plurality of contradictory perspectives. 
And if correct, wouldn’t this plurality of contradic-
tory perspectives undermine any legitimate idea of 
worldview? 
In the eighteenth century, philosophers aware 
of the problems raised in accounting for percep-
tion and knowledge argued that knowledge arising 
from sense experience is subordinated to necessities of 
the structure of the human mind (“Vernunft”).10 The un-
intended eventual consequence of this argument 
was the permanent separation of reality into sub-
jective and objective realms, with consciousness 
now being primary and independent. We will re-
turn to this momentarily. Many people now believe 
that there is no single right way of looking at reality, 
no single right worldview, only incompatible per-
spectives and “incommensurable paradigms.” 11
Negative Connotation
As some writers understand the term, worldview 
has the connotation of unmitigated “perspectiv-
ism,” implying that humans are fogbound within 
their own perspective, or system. (Those who ac-
tually believe that they themselves are fogbound 
like this might be asked how it was possible that 
they made this discovery, given that they were sup-
posedly captives within their own system.) If talk 
of worldview assumes or necessarily leads to such 
“perspectivism,” it is understandable that it has 
been greeted with distrust and skepticism. 
This connotation exemplifies a key feature of 
modernism, namely a preconceived notion of a gap 
between that which is seen and anything that might 
exist outside of perception—an assumed chasm 
separating consciousness and a so-called external 
world. It suggests the primacy or ultimacy of views. 
The rabbit/duck, a wood engraving, from Germany, 
is Kaninchen und Ente, published in Fliegende  Blätter, 
1939. The young woman/old woman drawing is 
from an unidentified German postcard of 1888, 
called “Junge Frau oder Hexe?”drawn by the English 
artist W.E. Hill, Punk magazine, USA, 1915. 
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Everything that is seen is then a matter of (con-
sciousness and) someone’s view. Accordingly, what 
we see is a result of our angle or vantage point but 
even more of our prejudice, will, linguistic condi-
tioning, and cultural bias. Here we detect the mod-
ernist and post-modernist attitude of suspicion and 
a complete rejection of the long venerated, classical 
and medieval assumption of an adaequatio re et intel-
lectus, a coordination of viewer and viewed.
The contemporary relativist attitude considers 
perception to be “underdetermined” by any collec-
tion of ingredients, either internal or external. This 
attitude, then, has moved away from that of the 
eighteenth-century modernist philosophers, who 
contended that the observer is furnished with cer-
tain “standard equipment,” which when used to 
process the input from the senses produces reli-
able knowledge. While that “modernist” approach 
was clever, it was soon interpreted as meaning that 
beauty and everything else was indeed only in the 
eye of the beholder. This view is part of the back-
ground of the negative, subjectivistic connotation 
of worldview. According to contemporary relativ-
ists, neither the structure of human subjectivity, 
nor the structure of what is, uniformly produces 
what is perceived. Knowing is controlled, not by 
a set of regular human faculties or by what is, but 
by random, ever-changing factors in the viewer—
unconscious interests and desires. Knowledge is 
ultimately a matter of perspective, a way of seeing 
and perceiving. In this view, total human autonomy 
is assumed, the idea that human beings have an 
unlimited control and are completely self-deter-
mining. But ironically, this very view can switch 
at any moment to its own opposite, into the view 
that nature is determined and is an all-determining 
mechanism—over which humans have little or no 
control.
The nativity of this relativist perspectivism, which 
we have been discussing, is sometimes ascribed to 
the German Idealist philosophy of Kant, Fichte, 
or Schopenhauer. This ascription is ironic, how-
ever, since Kant, at least, believed he was point-
ing out the standard equipment and various ratio-
nal necessities controlling human perception and 
knowledge-acquisition, including the assumption, 
or postulate, of a world. While he believed he was 
giving a firm basis to scientific knowledge, his 
philosophy eventually achieved the opposite in 
the popular mind. Perception came to be seen as 
more subjective than ever and less connected to a 
known (or even knowable) world. Reality outside 
of the human mind became ever more hypotheti-
cal. By ascribing to “inner sense” or “intuition” 
(Anschauung) a universal role in knowing, “in-
tuition” took on an exaggerated importance. It 
(Anschauung) was also connected by Kant to the 
notion of world (Welt in German), giving us the 
German term Weltanschauung—which might have 
been more correctly translated world-intuition in-
stead of world-view. In any case, it was only a new 
name for something not new—a perspective of 
the whole. 12 Although worldview is sometimes given 
a bad name because of such associations—and 
hence has led some (Christian) writers to conclude 
that it is a contaminated and dangerous notion—
there is little good reason to surrender the term to 
this negative usage or confuse it with a proper defi-
nition or connotation. 
Positive Connotation and Use
Ideally speaking, a worldview represents a uni-
fied “life-conception,”13 affirming and indicating 
how the many facets of life fit together. Things 
are meant to line up, fall into place, and constitute 
“their own kinds.” While there are legitimate dif-
ferences in perspective, these are not caused by 
any supposed indefiniteness or unknowability of 
the world; instead, they arise out of both the rich-
ness of creation and the limitations or fallibility of 
human knowing. For example, some beliefs are 
distorted, based on a limited or mistaken acquain-
tance with things. Yet the world is far from being 
an unknowable thing in itself or a mere aggregate 
of parts. Just the opposite is the case; it is so rich 
in meaning that there is practically an inexhaust-
ible diversity of pictures that can be drawn of it 
(including any one of its lakes) without exhausting 
its meaning. This is so, partly because of its tempo-
ral character—things go through phases, grow and 
develop in time, repeatedly revealing a new gestalt. 
The break, gap, or fragmentation that can some-
times alienate knower and known is not original 
but adventitious, signifying dysfunction and break 
down, not a shortage of meaning, reality, or truth. 
A worldview may color but cannot create what 
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is there, or all of what is perceived. While every 
worldview has its limitations, both internal incon-
sistencies and faults in its account of reality, there 
is usually some visible hint of these limitations, es-
pecially when they are very mistaken in some way. 
Whether a person takes seriously the hint or light 
coming through the cracks in the wall depends 
upon the person’s courage, integrity, and good 
faith. 
Failure to follow up indications of problems 
can be disastrous. This truth became painfully 
clear to me in talking to the parents of friends I 
made while studying in Germany in the 1980s. As 
Christian teenagers, they had all joined the Hitler 
Youth League—Hitlerjugend—and saw nothing 
wrong with it at the time. After many questions 
and much discussion, at least one thing (hint) came 
out in each case that, if followed up, could possibly 
have opened their eyes to the surrounding evil—as 
it did to the youth of Die Weiße Rose group in 1941.14 
One such missed hint was briefly witnessing the 
horrible condition and mistreatment of a group 
of prisoners—quickly “explained” by a parent as 
treatment reserved for “traitors to our country”—
which allowed the terrible sight to be categorized, 
sanitized, and forgotten until much later. Another 
case was the family’s (of one of the people I talk-
ed to) being told by long-time friends, who were 
Jewish, “You must never visit us again, because it 
could put you in danger.” The family could not—
did not work hard enough to—understand what 
this warning signified.
In a significant way, sinful human beings are 
still at home in this world and often have oppor-
tunities to rectify or compensate for its present 
brokenness. We are made for learning and cre-
ated for discovery—we are supposed to become 
acquainted with God, his handiwork, its kinds, its 
regularities, and its patterns, i.e., its unity and in-
terconnections. An eye for worldviews can assist 
in this process. Although there are ways in which 
we seem to know God directly, what we grasp 
(of Him through Scripture) is understood largely 
through our perspective and experience in cre-
ation. Scripture often instructs us by comparing 
God to the behavior of things around us, like birds 
caring for their young or shepherds keeping their 
sheep or the sun rising anew each morning.
Worldview properly refers to a coherence of be-
liefs within a world for which humans were well 
suited—and this is its proper connotation. It grants 
only a secondary importance to “view,” since “a 
view” is not quite the same as “the truth.” Some 
of the differences between the two connotations 
are a matter of emphasis, one focusing on human 
volition and consciousness, and the other seeing 
human life as coordinated with what is there, the 
order and laws by which God governs and sustains 
the universe. A proper awareness of worldview is 
meant to alert people to the way (primary) beliefs 
attract similar (secondary) ones, repel contrary 
ones, and form unified belief-systems. Knowledge 
of a worldview can alert a person to far-reaching 
implications and consequences of first principles. 
No one can avoid having some perspective, with 
its own direction, guiding thought along certain 
lines, showing it where to go, and indicating con-
cordant action. 
There is a limited number of first principles or 
primary beliefs, and this means that worldviews 
are seldom if ever individually but rather commu-
nally held. Belief is understood here as a commit-
ment with a specific character and a potential cost 
if upheld in practice.
Worldviews also map things out, give guid-
ance and direction to human thought and action, 
but motivate only in a secondary sense, not with 
the driving force of religion. Factors such as fear, 
greed, and pride also play a big role in motivation 
and sometimes work against or in the opposite 
direction of a person’s own worldview. By inclin-
ing persons to act contrary to what they (say they) 
believe, such cravings commonly give rise to dis-
sonance and confusion within their worldview. 
In a significant way, sinful 
human beings are still at 
home in this world and often 
have opportunities to rectify 
or compensate for its present 
brokenness.
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Because fear, greed, and pride are not in accord 
with the deepest confession of the heart, they act 
as foreign or inauthentic motivations—not render-
ing the satisfaction to people of having acted with 
the courage of their convictions or of having done 
what they knew was good and right. 
A number of key points can now be summa-
rized. People are unavoidably possessed of beliefs 
and assumptions about reality. These beliefs and 
assumptions constitute not mere collections but 
“comprehensive frameworks.” 15 As we have seen, 
people are not possessed of unrelated individual 
beliefs simply standing side by side, like marbles 
bouncing around in a bag, but rather are possessed 
by congruent systems, webs, or frameworks of be-
lief, each with a distinctive esprit of its own. If hu-
man beliefs and “belief-forming processes” were 
essentially singular or atomic, we would have a 
hard time making sense of the mutual attraction 
of similar and repulsion of contrary beliefs. This is 
one of the most remarkable characteristics of the 
way human beliefs work, that is, the appearance of 
systems or families of beliefs bearing a common 
spirit. 
Since some beliefs have greater weight and au-
thority, more and farther reaching implications, than oth-
ers, these may be thought of as primary beliefs. For 
this reason, beliefs form hierarchical structures in 
which the primary ones take the lead in coloring 
the whole framework or worldview. Because beliefs 
are drawn together to form webs, or systems, it is 
rather uncommon to find a person whose thoughts 
combine diametrically opposed primary beliefs.16 
When a primary belief is altered, the change usu-
ally has far reaching ramifications, whereas the 
changing of a secondary belief or opinion occa-
sions little notice. 
The attraction and repulsion of human beliefs 
that give rise to systems of belief and worldviews 
make blatant inconsistencies and contradictions 
within a worldview all the more interesting and 
puzzling. If things function and work as they are 
supposed to most of the time, why don’t they al-
ways work in this way? This question requires 
more attention. For the moment we can only be 
reminded that the presence of dysfunction does 
not contradict the existence of normal or proper 
function but rather reinforces it. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that every 
normal adult human has a worldview, we should 
ask whether it is final or subordinate to something 
else more profound and all-controlling. A world-
view represents a person’s primary beliefs, yet it de-
pends upon something deeper, namely, a person’s 
religion, religious commitment, or religious state. 
In general, worldview is subordinate to religion. 
Worldview depends upon but is not the same as re-
ligion; it reflects religion’s intellectual structure or 
bent. Religion is more than a set of ideas or way of 
thinking to which a person acquiesces. It has a vi-
tal or lived-out quality that transcends both theory 
and ideology. Religion involves being connected to 
something that transcends visible reality and em-
braces the divine in some way. To be divine is to be 
self-existent, dependent on nothing else.17
A key biblical term in connection with reli-
gious is heart. Although an adequate account can-
not be given here, something must be said about 
this word because of its frequent use in Scripture 
in connection with a person’s basic religious ori-
entation. This is not the modern usage of heart as 
organ of infatuation. The heart is the center from 
which all kinds of activity begin. The heart is said 
to devise plans, to think, to speak. Sometimes 
it is said to be foolish, darkened, divided in alle-
giance. The tongue speaks, but the heart is far off; 
or the heart speaks, but something in us is unable 
or won’t listen. We are in the bivalent position of 
being both its keeper and its dependent—we rely 
upon it for guidance, initiation of action, but we 
must also guard it carefully. Scripture speaks of the 
heart as having its desires, which are often (but not 
always) given by God. In a sense, it can’t be de-
frauded or dissuaded from doing what it is set on, 
either for good or for evil. We can pretend we want 
to do one thing, but if there are other plans (pri-
orities or treasures) in our heart, they will prevail. 
(This is not the level at which worldviews operate, 
although it is the place out of which they grow and 
receive direction.) 
I have tried to show that worldview is more 
than a mere convention or human construction yet 
less than a simple given of nature. It appears to be a 
way human beliefs cluster themselves together and 
divvy themselves up to form patterns or systems 
of belief. This process initially happens without 
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The willingness to test our 
ideas against experience 
repeatedly and adjust our 
view of kinds and types 
accordingly is a perennial 
goal of a Christian 
worldview, true science, 
and philosophy.
great conscious effort. It is learned, but it first hap-
pens at an intuitive level; and like a person’s na-
tive language (for example, English), it normally 
needs education in order for its facility in use to 
be gained; refinement and cultivation are necessary 
and beneficial.
Assumptions about “Kinds”
As described above, knowing that a certain person 
has a certain worldview is a little like acquaintance 
with a (natural) kind: once you have recognized it, 
you have a way of anticipating behavior in that kind 
and that person. Without going into detail about 
the status of natural kinds, I should say something 
about assumptions, since it is often said that acting 
on the basis of one or another is inevitable. When 
we say “fruit,” “worldview” or “human being,” 
“chair,” “act of courage” or “dog,” do we refer to 
a universal—or only names coined in experience 
for convenience sake? The standard views are that 
their existence is either (1) ontological (Plato), (2) 
conceptual (Aristotle), (3) verbal (Ockham), or 
what one Christian author takes to be a matter 
of (4) creation disclosure (H. Dooyeweerd). This 
distinction is significant because it affects the im-
portance attributed to experience in contrast to the 
use of reason, models, paradigms, or perspectives, 
particularly in the sciences—the role attributed to 
empirical input. In attempting to explain patterns 
or regularities, one can easily overlook any (new) 
factors that don’t easily fit within the familiar, es-
tablished perspective. This means that there comes 
a moment when the usefulness of an established 
theory, paradigm, or (world) view has shrunk, and 
the expansion or renovation of the familiar per-
spective is needed. You will be able to make sense 
of the new experience or observation, only when 
struggle (imagining and borrowing) has yielded a 
new or renewed perspective. This idea of struggle 
implies the limited practical validity of the Platonic 
and Aristotelian notions of inborn or fixed “forms” 
because in both cases, these notions have (in prin-
ciple) a very limited openness to correction by ex-
perience.
Degrees of Openness
While the process of seeing and recognizing things 
always occurs within some frame of reference, each 
community is more or less open and has a greater 
or lesser willingness to face certain things that are 
unknown and to learn from them. To recognize 
“new” things requires openness and imagina-
tion—stretching oneself and one’s perspective—
to go from the known to the unknown. There are 
various types and degrees of openness, for ex-
ample, to instruction, to correction, and to what 
is there, outside of us, waiting to be experienced 
and discovered. Indeed, the rise of modern sci-
ence has been credited, in part, to the third view of 
“kinds” outlined above—late medieval nominal-
ism. By accepting the idea that kinds and categories 
are human models, constructed by using language 
and numbers to formulate the regularities of expe-
rience (as laws), various thinkers began forsaking 
Platonic or Aristotelian deductive methods (based 
on universal “essences”) in favor of more tinker-
ing-based, inductive methods of studying nature 
and a more malleable approach to kinds.
However, the idea of being completely open to 
experience and using only induction is an illusion, 
since complete openness would only mean indis-
crimination and pretending that theories arise au-
tomatically (as Francis Bacon imagined). The will-
ingness to test our ideas against experience repeat-
edly and adjust our view of kinds and types accord-
ingly is a perennial goal of a Christian worldview, 
true science, and philosophy. 18 Human knowledge 
is not a copy or mirror of nature; it is a human ac-
count of what is behind the observable regularities, 
historically qualified articulation of formulas, laws, 
and decrees holding for the behavior and function 
of creation.
18     Pro Rege—June 2012
Worldview Benefits
Thinking in terms of worldview can help us recog-
nize the logically consistent inferences of our be-
liefs. Knowing that a certain person has a certain 
worldview (biblical or otherwise) sometimes makes 
it possible to anticipate accurately what his or her 
opinion will be on various issues. Each particular 
community with its own intellectual-spiritual ori-
entation has its own worldview and key insight. 
Behind each such community (and worldview) is 
locked a criterion for selecting, interpreting, and 
arranging life and pursuing certain goals. Even 
an implicitly held worldview offers an interpretive 
framework for identifying and understanding (or 
sometimes misunderstanding) other communities (of 
belief), cultures, and historical periods. 
As a result, a worldview allows identification in 
two ways—one for the identifier and one for the 
identified. Because each community (or collective, 
partly) embodies a worldview, each is distinctive 
and identifiable, making it possible for a person 
familiar with it to pick out its members. To know 
or have knowledge of something also involves ac-
quaintance with its effects. We don’t know what a 
lake is like just by looking at it. Acquaintance with 
its kind and all other types and kinds can tell us a 
great deal and assist us in recognizing the things 
we meet. Without such knowledge, we would have 
to experience each unique individual, its operation, 
it actions, its doings, and its effect upon us, in order 
to know what it is.
Pictures and Truth
I now return to questions raised earlier about see-
ing two images in one picture. By concentrating 
on one or another of the leading features of a pic-
ture and taking one’s cue from that feature, one 
determines the image one will perceive. 19 I dare 
say, nobody can see both images at the same time, 
but one can move quickly back and forth between 
the images. We are inclined to ask, “Which of the 
images is the real thing?” We know from the vi-
sual compensating we do that we can be fooled 
and tricked, and it may be the artist’s intention to 
do just that. We also know that the caterpillar be-
comes a butterfly, that dead-looking wood branch-
es produce gorgeous colored blossoms, that every 
coin has two sides, that the tiny baby becomes the 
large adult; but we assume that a thing is one thing, 
with a single identity, when pressed to determine it. 
When Jesus says that the same tree cannot pro-
duce good and bad fruit and that the same well 
cannot bring forth sweet and bitter water, he is not 
unaware of changing cycles over time. Indeed, it is 
time that is the key to the changing images we are 
discussing. That one thing can function in many 
ways over time poses no problem; a hammer can 
be both a paper weight and a nail driver, a car can 
offer both shelter and transport, and a light can of-
fer both heat and illumination. 
If one can pick out an image in a cloud as chil-
dren often do, and then another and another, is 
there any problem with that? And if a third thing 
can be seen in the rabbit-duck drawing, should that 
be troubling? As a rule, things start out as one thing 
with a specific function; they can then change or 
be changed. Changing and transforming things is 
essential to artistic activity. The mutability of mate-
rials, their susceptibility to change and molding, is 
the condition of artistic work. Even if one thing has 
many (possible, potential) functions and images, 
one function or image almost always starts out as 
the chief, even if another soon takes over.
All of this illustrates the richness and fecundity 
of creation—mentioned earlier. There is wonder 
stored up in a thing made by a very imaginative 
Creator. “There are more things in heaven and 
earth my dear Horatio, than is dreamt of in your 
philosophy,” says Shakespeare’s Hamlet.20 And if 
one asks what is really there when one is looking 
at the different images in the clouds, the answer 
may have to be that it is just a cloud, and a drawing 
is just paper and ink—although as the handiwork 
of God, there is so much more that we cannot de-
scribe it all.
Presence in the World, Absence On-Line: A 
Cyber-Sized World-View
What about images on the computer? What ef-
fect are the long hours of sitting in front of our 
computers and Internet screens having on our life 
and world-view? Prior to the late 1980s, people in 
a few occupations spent long hours sitting in front 
of their typewriters. Now millions spend most 
of their days looking into screens, staring at texts 
and pictures on their computers. While our world 
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(view) is hugely enlarged in the narrow electronic 
channels of the streaming audio-visual informa-
tion presented to us on the Web, it lacks presence 
and depth of perspective, it lacks the grounding 
of boundaries, of location in space, and the last-
chance limitations of time. Although the Internet 
can show us places and things from all over the 
world, everything we experience takes place right 
in a room while we are sitting at a table, staring 
into a screen. 
It is hard to say what influence the On-Line 
illusion of presence and the reality of absence is 
having, in particular, upon relationships. While it 
is often said that the Internet brings people closer 
together, in some ways the opposite is true. It cer-
tainly can increase the frequency and number of 
people we reach—with the touch of a button—but 
it is contact with no price. The ease with which we 
can fire off an email to a person or include some-
one in a group message facilitates cheapness of in-
tent and shallowness of content. It breeds disregard 
in both sender and receiver. One is reminded of the 
emptiness of computer-generated birthday cards 
sent by agencies. The lowering of the threshold to 
writing someone is having a questionable effect on 
relationships. Can it make for better, more authen-
tic communication? Even the act of speaking to 
someone on the telephone asks for a higher degree 
of engagement and sincerity. The lowered contact 
threshold affects the depth and intensity of the 
communication and relationship. Writing no lon-
ger requires special effort, nor results in a tangible 
artifact. It can be done with any motive or scarcely 
any motive at all. 
Why do people sometimes travel all the way 
across the country just to be with another per-
son—even for only a few days or hours? What’s 
the difference between just talking to people on a 
telephone or through a computer screen and being 
in the same place together, present with them? In 
both cases, we can see and hear each other. What 
bearing or effect does being present together have 
upon us compared to communication at a distance 
by electronic means? Being present gives to and re-
quires of us something more. Being absent elimi-
nates touch, smell, and a sense of nearness. All 
parties are less vulnerable; the possibility of being 
uncomfortable or frightened by the other person, 
or of imposing or being imposed upon is dimin-
ished. We can be quite indifferent towards one an-
other and hardly notice it when apart. Acting and 
pretending are much easier and the temptation of 
insincerity greater.
Virtual presence and actual absence can also 
affect what we consider natural, intuitive, or self-
evident and as such may alter the basis upon which 
we draw conclusions and make decisions. It can 
bring about a kind of insensitivity or numbness, 
because it is more partial (virtual) than we realize. 
It can both open up and stunt the growth of young 
people. For some, it becomes a replacement for a 
real (social) life. It allows people to withdraw into 
exclusive networks of friends and family, no longer 
needing anyone else, allowing them to close them-
selves off from all other contact. It makes it easy 
to stay within all their limitations and fears. It has 
also become a major source of addiction to many 
people, particularly addiction to game playing. 
The more people live a web-based existence, 
the more their frames of reference and world 
(view) shrink, though they can be jolted back to 
fuller presence and awareness. By shrinking these 
limits, we land in utopia, precisely nowhere. In 
one sense, being On-Line is to be no place except 
in our heads, at least until we move away from 
the computer screen. Our worldview becomes a 
Google-sized, filtered Internet portal (under con-
stant surveillance). It is a controlled environment. 
There is no out-of-doors available On-Line. We 
control much, and are controlled: if we don’t wish 
to meet someone, we can click off—delete is al-
ways only a button away; and yet no one is ever re-
ally with us. We are more in contact than ever and 
less in contact than ever—firewalls (and worlds) 
away from reality and other people. What this will 
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do to us in the long run remains to be seen, but at 
present it allows us to create a sense of a man-made 
world(view) without presence: a universe in which 
much good talk about God can still end up sound-
ing awfully hollow. 
This nowhere Utopia fits well with a public 
philosophy that tells educated Western people they 
are in control of themselves, that what they do and 
think is within their own power, that they are au-
tonomous—a law unto themselves. Many believe 
humanity is in charge of itself, can recreate itself, 
can wholly recreate the world. Yet when I walk 
down the street and smell something appetizing, 
something in me can crave it even if I do not wish to 
have any such craving. Before consciously deciding 
to get up in the morning, I sometimes notice I have 
stood up and am heading for the wash room. Many 
things bypass my will, such as appetites, instinctive 
cravings, longings. These may indicate something 
I need but don’t at the moment want. Sometimes 
there is cultural interference between my ideas and 
my needs—because of certain notions or fears I 
have acquired. Indications of need are sometimes 
overlooked, ignored, or suppressed—like a crav-
ing to eat something with the vitamins in it I need. 
We can learn by observing such operations in our-
selves. Their message is that there is more to me 
than I think, will, or consciously understand. Our 
thirst does not arise from our worldview—even 
though our thirsts, too, are trained, for example, to 
want water, wine, milk, or coke.
Conclusion
Rather than thinking of ourselves as autonomous 
“individuals,” unattached to the rest of reality, we 
should recognize our relation to it, including all the 
ways our thought patterns are meant to reflect it; 
the many interconnections largely constitute our 
peculiar existence. These interconnections do not 
mean, however, that our thought lacks all origi-
nality or independence. Thanks to the way God 
has made and sustains us, we are not robots! Yet 
thankfully we constantly meet with hints of or-
ganizing structure(s) in and outside of ourselves. 
We perceive in freedom, in orderly ways, by virtue 
of divine ordinances and law—to which we are, 
thankfully, always subject—yet not in bondage. 
Under the best circumstances, there will be a good 
match between our views of the world and the way 
the world is. The fit, however, will never be perfect 
or exhaustive because for that, the creation is far 
too rich and dynamic.
Our perspective on life reflects and corre-
sponds in varying degrees to an order that is larger 
than ourselves. It is intimated to us even in a fallen 
world and even through a less than perfect world-
view. Beginning in earliest childhood we are in-
structed by intuition, instincts however minimal, 
and a tacit awareness of the arrangement of the 
world prior to our thought becoming self-con-
scious and focused. Such intuitive and tacit func-
tioning is wonderfully evident in language, the way 
speech is learned by infants even before they real-
ize what they are doing; they begin to talk and ex-
press themselves using signs or words long before 
analysis or independent understanding develops. 
We want and try to talk even before possessing a 
vocabulary because we are human beings—made 
to talk. Being so made is what allows us to learn, 
develop, and acquire language in the first place. 
Reality is made to be spoken of, and we are made 
to speak of it. Things are created to be known, and 
we are created to know them, to gain a view of the 
world and to gain acquaintance with God.
While there is nothing foolproof about the way 
all this human learning and “viewing” takes place, 
we constantly receive hints and indications telling 
us when we are right and when we are wrong, by 
the test of time and experience. Self-awareness and 
observation are there to teach us basic knowledge, 
and they far exceed what we consciously control. 
In a tacit way, we discover that many things are 
happening, are being suggested to us; we are being 
asked to respond to these things—some of which 
we eventually realize in a deliberate way. Many 
signals, however, go unnoticed because our world-
view is off the mark, more a constricting ideology 
than an expanding vantage point. Sometimes we 
learn more about the world by careful observa-
tion of our own intuition and tacit awareness of 
things than by looking at things directly or by what 
we are taught. The ideas of our culture, or what 
experts and celebrated thinkers tell us, can easily 
be false. Cultivating an awareness of the esprit d’ 
ensemble of all the things people think and believe 
offers the attentive observer an extra filter and a 
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valuable guide in sorting out what is (most likely) 
true. Recognizing that there is always one or an-
other interpretive framework in play can be greatly 
instructive to us and lead us to deeper insight into 
ourselves, others and other communities.
This is the original rabbit/duck wood 
engraving, Kaninchen und Ente, published 
in Fliegende  Blätter, 1939. 
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